The following is a recent conversation I had with a Calvinist. I enjoyed it because it was not emotionally charged even though he was asking questions in an effort to refute my arguments against Calvinistic determinism. His questions were thoughtful and allowed for clarification from which all can benefit.
Please enjoy the following exchange (for clarity, the Calvinist’s words are in blue. My words are in black):
Calvinist: Dr. Stratton, you have said this many times, but here’s two [of your quotes]:
//By a deity of deception, I simply am referring to a supernatural deity who intentionally uses his power to necessitate your false metaphysical and theological beliefs.//
//I have explained what I mean by “deception.” A productive interlocutor needs to deal with the concept I have been clear to advance. The concept of what I’m advancing does not need the word “deceptive” for the argument to move forward. It simply needs to show that on EDD, a deity determines all Christians to affirm false theological beliefs.//
I don’t understand. So, if a God determines all things, and “all” includes one’s false theological (and I suppose metaphysical) beliefs, then this God is tantamount to a deity of deception. Okay, so if I understand this correctly, this is just your premise (1), right?
Here is the argument [you advance]:
A1- If EDD is true, then God determines all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs.
A2- If God determines all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs, then God is deceptive and His Word (the Bible) cannot be trusted.
A3- God is not deceptive and His Word can be trusted.
A4- Therefore, God does not determine all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs.
A5- Therefore, EDD is false.
I don’t think any determinist will deny (A1); it is true by definition. But, why would a compatibilist-determinist (in the sense of someone who believes also that God’s goodness is compatible with His divine determination of all things) accept premise (A2)? This now becomes a problem of evil issue, and determinists are welcome to any proposed solution (i.e., soul-building, divine intimacy, O Felix Culpa, compatibilist free will defense, etc.).
So there is no independent reason a compatibilist-determinist (understood in the sense of one who believes in the compatibility of God’s goodness and His determining evil, if “deception” is indeed considered an evil… which we are not told that it is in fact evil, you have just assumed that it is) should accept premise (A2). Think of this as a soft-line reply.
A hard-line reply could accept premise (A2) but reject the conjunction of the consequent as it doesn’t seem to follow; where is the argument that all deception is bad or morally evil? Why does it follow that if God is therefore deceptive, then it just must be true that His Word then cannot be trusted? I suppose you could give your usual analogy by arguing that if Johnny is a known liar, would you trust him? (or something along those lines). But, why does it follow that if God is in fact deceptive then he is therefore a liar in a morally objectionable senes? The French family hiding Jews from the Nazis could tell the Nazis that they are not in fact hiding Jews. At first glance, they are lying, and they are being deceptive, but do we blame the French family for their lying and deception? I don’t have that intuition at all.
So these preliminary thoughts reveal (to my mind anyway) a shortcoming of your argument, namely, it bites way too much off than it can actually chew. Your argument, to be successful, needs to relate lying to deception (or show that is a connection if there is not a connection), and if deception is actually always morally wrong (same with lying), and if one lies to another in a sort of deceptive manner, this automatically means that trust has been violated. A short skim through the Stanford Encyclopedia article on lying and deception will quickly reveal that many of your assumptions embedded behind the scenes of your premises can have doubt cast upon them. To me, this is not a good start to an argument.
TIM: Although there’s some misunderstandings here, your question is fantastic as it allows us to pinpoint these issues.
You said, //I don’t think any determinist will deny (A1); it is true by definition. But, why would a compatibilist-determinist (in the sense of someone who believes also that God’s goodness is compatible with His divine determination of all things) accept premise (A2)?//
Great question! Recall that I am not attacking the goodness of God. After all, for the sake of argument, I grant Guillaume Bignon’s response to me that God might have morally sufficient reasons to determine all of his followers to affirm false theological beliefs. The problem is that all of his followers are determined to affirm false theological beliefs. So, as I have made clear in my recent video, this view of compatibilism is not under attack. I am showing that other important things are not compatible with EDD. That point is so important not to miss.
Moreover, I think it’s ad hoc to not accept the second premise. As I’ve argued on multiple occasions, here’s a section from my recent “Epistemic Meltdown” article responding to another Calvinist:
“Think about it: If a wizard, a demon, or a Jedi using a mind trick used their power to necessitate your false beliefs, then these folks would properly be referred to as deceptive agents. Now, suppose a Jedi intentionally used his power to determine and necessitate all people to affirm false beliefs about ultimate reality. It would be fair to describe this fellow as a ‘Jedi of deception.’ If a demon used his power to determine and necessitate all humans to affirm false beliefs about ultimate reality, it would be fair to say that this being is a ‘demon of deception.’
What’s the difference between a demon of deception and a deity of deception? Does a deity who intentionally uses his power to determine and necessitate all humans to affirm false beliefs about ultimate reality suddenly become non-deceptive just because this being has more power than demons? Is this deity who determines all humans to affirm false beliefs about ultimate reality suddenly become non-deceptive just because he created the universe? If Loki, the ‘god of mischief,’ created the universe, is he no longer a ‘god of mischief’? Of course not. Loki is still untrustworthy, and so is any deity who intentionally uses his power to determine every single human — including all Christ followers — to affirm false theological beliefs.”
It is clear that this is not a “problem of evil (PoE) issue,” at least not as it is typically advanced. I think my argument might be able to be used as a first step of another PoE issue, but I am not attempting to make that case here.
You said, //So there is no independent reason a compatibilist-determinist (understood in the sense of one who believes in the compatibility of God’s goodness and His determining evil, if “deception” is indeed considered an evil… which we are not told that it is in fact evil, you have just assumed that it is) should accept premise (A2). Think of this as a soft-line reply.//
To reiterate: I am not assuming divine deception is necessarily evil. In fact, on the other hand, am granting it for the sake of argument (even though it seems to contradict Hebrews 6:18 – unless God has morally sufficient reasons to be deceptive about that, too). I am not presupposing all deception is always evil. This specific argument I am advancing here has nothing to do with an “evil god.”
You said, //A hard-line reply could accept premise (A2) but reject the conjunction of the consequent as it doesn’t seem to follow; where is the argument that all deception is bad or morally evil?//
I have not made one and this is irrelevant to my case. Indeed, as I have made clear elsewhere, sometimes it is good to deceive Nazis on your doorstep when you’re hiding Jews in the basement. But note, just because it is good to deceive, does not mean that the good person did not deceive. So, even if it’s good for God to deceive all of the elect on important theological matters, all of the elect are still deceived on important theological matters.
You asked, //Why does it follow that if God is therefore deceptive, then it just must be true that His Word then cannot be trusted?//
For the same reason that Kato’s testimony could not be trusted in the video I offered (linked above). Let’s suppose that Kato had morally sufficient reasons to do everything he did while on the witness stand. It still follows that his testimony cannot be trusted (even if Kato is a great guy who deceived the court for morally sufficient reasons and for our ultimate benefit). Moreover, if one is willing to say that God has morally sufficient reasons to deceive all of His followers, then why should we trust a document he inspired? For all we know, this deity might have morally sufficient reasons to give us tons of false information about ultimate reality in that book.
If we start with a presupposed view that God is a deity of deception (even with morally sufficient reasons), and determines the entirety of human mental activity, then epistemic meltdown ensues. We must reject EDD, and if we are going to presuppose anything, presuppose that God is a maximally great God of truth who desires all people to know the truth and that He has made this possible. To avoid epistemic self-destruction, we cannot presuppose that a deity determines all humans — including all Christ followers — to affirm false theological beliefs.
You asked, //I suppose you could give your usual analogy by arguing that if Johnny is a known liar, would you trust him? (or something along those lines). But, why does it follow that if God is in fact deceptive then he is therefore a liar in a morally objectionable senes?//
I’ve not made that case. God might be a liar for morally sufficient reasons (contra Hebrews 6:18). Although a seemingly odd, unbiblical, and ad hoc move, I grant it. However, it is irrelevant to my case.
You said, //The French family hiding Jews from the Nazis could tell the Nazis that they are not in fact hiding Jews. At first glance, they are lying, and they are being deceptive, but do we blame the French family for their lying and deception? I don’t have that intuition at all.//
Amen to that! You and I are on the exact same page on this matter.
The problem is that we are not on the same page when it comes to the actual argument. You seem to be defending a position I am not attacking. We are ships passing by in the night. The argument on my ship, however, is still untouched.
I hope that helps, brother. Thank you for your questions which allowed clarification.
Calvinist: Dr. Stratton, I have found some time to respond. Feel free to take the last word. But this will be my last:
You said, //Recall that I am not attacking the goodness of God. After all, for the sake of argument, I grant Bignon’s response to me that God might have morally sufficient reasons to determine all of his followers to affirm false theological beliefs. The problem is that all of his followers are determined to affirm false theological beliefs. So, as I have made clear in my recent video, this view of compatibilism is not under attack. I am showing that other important things are not compatible with EDD.//
So, if God has morally sufficient reasons to determine S’s false theological beliefs, then why would He therefore be untrustworthy? I don’t have this intuition (as I will hope to explain more below). I don’t see a problem with God determining His followers to affirm false theological beliefs, especially if the mechanism in which He determines them is reliable. I mentioned this in my Volume 2 reply to you under the “Star Wars Thought Experiment” section.
You wrote, //“Think about it: If a wizard, a demon, or a Jedi using a mind trick used their power to necessitate your false beliefs, then these folks would properly be referred to as deceptive agents… //
Why would they be referred to as deceptive agents? What is the necessary and sufficient conditions for being deceptive? Is it determining false beliefs? Why? None of these are answered here. Plus, Thad Botham gave a counterexample to this premise half a year ago on your own page. So, as the premise stands, it’s much too weak to do the heavy-lifting you want it to do (which is what I originally said in my comment above).
You said, //Loki is still untrustworthy, and so is any deity who intentionally uses his power to determine every single human — including all Christ followers — to affirm false theological beliefs.//
Plausibly, Loki is still untrustworthy because he doesn’t have morally sufficient reasons, *not* because he determines S to affirm false theological beliefs. If God has morally sufficient reasons for being deceptive, how, then, does that mean He is untrustworthy? If someone lied to me for morally sufficient reasons, I don’t have the inclination to not trust that person at all. If they didn’t have those reasons, then plausibly I wouldn’t trust them.
You said, //Indeed, as I have made clear elsewhere, sometimes it is good to deceive Nazis on your doorstep when you’re hiding Jews in the basement. But note, just because it is good to deceive, does not mean that the good person did not deceive. So, even if it’s good for God to deceive all of the elect on important theological matters, all of the elect are still deceived on important theological matters.//
Okay, so we agree that there exists a case in which it is good for S1 to deceive S2. I can even grant that S1 deceived S2. So what? The issue is, is S1 untrustworthy because now S1 has deceived S2? My answer is certainly not! Why? Because S1 plausibly had morally sufficient reasons to deceive S2 which therefore helps explain his deception in a way that is not morally objectionable; i.e., in a way that inclines one to think that S1 is untrustworthy.
You replied, //For the same reason that Kato’s testimony could not be trusted in the video I offered. Let’s suppose that Kato had morally sufficient reasons to do everything he did while on the witness stand. It still follows that his testimony cannot be trusted (even if Kato is a great guy who deceived the court for morally sufficient reasons and for our ultimate benefit). . .//
I do not see how it follows that his testimony cannot be trusted. His reasons were morally sufficient, explainable, and plausibly relevant. Did Kato deceive? Sure, I suppose I can accept this. But, again, so what? Where is the connection/argument between “Kato deceived” to “Kato is now untrustworthy”, especially if there exists morally sufficient reasons for why Kato deceived the court?
You wrote, //The problem is that we are not on the same page when it comes to the actual argument. You seem to be defending a position I am not attacking. We are ships passing by in the night. The argument on my ship, however, is still untouched.//
I don’t see how. I am looking at premise (A2) and asking for the independent and contrastive reasons for why if God is deceptive, then it follows that He cannot be trusted. (A2) has a conjunctive consequent. The (paraphrased) antecedent says that if God determines S’s false theological beliefs, then “God is deceptive and His Word cannot be trusted.” Does this mean that “God is deceptive, and therefore it follows that His Word cannot be trusted”? Or does it mean that “God is deceptive AND His Word cannot be trusted” in the sense that God deceiving and His Word being untrustworthy are equivalent? I am not sure, and the premise does not guarantee one interpretation over the other.
You conceded that the French family lying to Nazi’s is okay, and we do not blame them. Alright; then, is the French family untrustworthy because of this deception? If you say no, then I will say “right, plausibly because they had morally sufficient reasons to deceive! And the same can go for God.” If you say yes, then I don’t share that intuition; why on Earth would that family suddenly become untrustworthy? Either way, how is God’s deception (which I am not necessarily endorsing here, but allowing it for the sake of argument) related or connected to Him being therefore untrustworthy? You do not tell us.
Thank you for your time.
Also, I just think there are so many counterexamples to the “deception, therefore untrustworthy” premise. Think of a surprise birthday party. If my wife lied to me, and absolutely deceived me, gave me the false information about there being a surprise birthday party for me, and I believed her (because she is my wife), and if there was in fact a surprise birthday party for me, why would think she is suddenly untrustworthy? I cannot see how; even though she deceived me.
At any rate, I think a defense of premise (A2) would work best if you gave an independent/contrastive reason for it, namely it is an epistemic evil to deceive S, because then S is untrustworthy. But even granting this reason, the interlocutor will just respond with a theodicy/defense against this “epistemic evil.”
Hope you have a great day, Tim.
TIM: Thanks for your input and friendly pushback, brother. I like this kind of exchange. Have a great day, yourself.
Please allow me to briefly respond to your closing remark. You said:
//Either way, how is God’s deception (which I am not necessarily endorsing here, but allowing it for the sake of argument) related or connected to Him being therefore untrustworthy? You do not tell us.//
Yes, I have made this clear on multiple occasions. The problem is that if EDD is true, then God *IS* trustworthy – trustworthy to determine you to get theology wrong. That is to say, this deity cannot be trusted to always determine his followers to think and believe rightly regarding important theological matters (which may include the one’s we are discussing now). If that’s the case, then we stand in no epistemic position to know which of our theological beliefs are true and which are false. That’s the main point of my video entitled An epistemic Case Against Calvinism.
Since you and I are in the business of striving to get theology right, this seems to be a big problem for one who believes that God determines all things. This is what I’ve referred to as “epistemic meltdown.”
Regarding your wife lying to you about your surprise birthday party, since she has deceived you, now you do not stand in a position to trust your wife *on this topic* in the future. Indeed, she might tell you that you are not doing anything for your birthday next year, but you have reason to doubt her because she is known to be a “deceptive party planner” (for morally sufficient reasons). 
Anyway, that’s the way I see it. I could be missing something. Whatever the case might be, I sincerely appreciate your comments, brother. Have a great night too.
Proverbs 27:17
Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),
Dr. Tim Stratton
