Missing Melanchthon

Recently I have been accused of “historical eisegesis.”[1] According to Wikipedia, “eisegesis is the process of interpreting text in such a way as to introduce one’s own presuppositions . . . It is commonly referred to as reading into the text.” This is definitely a problem when someone does this when reading Scripture, but it’s … Continue reading Missing Melanchthon

Book Review: Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism by Timothy Stratton

How does God’s knowledge relate to the created world? And if God knows the future, what does that mean for human freedom? In Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism Tim Stratton seeks to shed light on these questions by engaging with the apparent conflict between human freedom and divine knowledge. The bulk of the book is … Continue reading Book Review: Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism by Timothy Stratton

The Location of Determinism

Question: Dr. Tim, The location of determinism, if external, could be seen as warrant to the conclusion that we are “meat puppets”. But why must we accept that determinism is solely through external “forces” beyond our control? First, this assumes control *must* be regulative. But more importantly, why can the location of determinism not be … Continue reading The Location of Determinism

Bignon’s Review of Mere Molinism: A Rejoinder

My recently published book, Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism, has, for the most part, received positive reviews. But I had anticipated a negative response from one particular philosopher, Guillaume Bignon, a Calvinist, whom I critiqued in the book. Bignon provided a 50-page “extremely negative assessment” criticizing almost everything in the book — from my … Continue reading Bignon’s Review of Mere Molinism: A Rejoinder

Reaching Reliable Beliefs

Question: Dr. Stratton, in your book you point out that if our thoughts and beliefs are causally determined by physics and chemistry, then they are not reliable. I agree since physics and chemistry are not intentionally aimed at true beliefs. However, related to that, you also say that even if God casually determines all of … Continue reading Reaching Reliable Beliefs

The FreeThinking Theist VS a Free Will Skeptic

I recently made a video for the FreeThinking Ministries YouTube channel entitled Divine Determinism and the GOD OF MISCHIEF. In this video I point out that if naturalistic determinism is true, then all human thoughts and beliefs are causally determined by the forces of nature, the initial conditions of the big bang, past events, perhaps … Continue reading The FreeThinking Theist VS a Free Will Skeptic

Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism

Foreword Dr. Tim Stratton has the rare and precious gift of taking highly complex issues in philosophical theology and making them easily understandable to laypeople at the same time as he shows their tremendous importance for scholars in the disciplines of philosophy and religion. This book will be profitably and enjoyably read by laypeople and … Continue reading Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism

Evidence in the Flesh for Apologetics

I was raised in a family and a community where religious beliefs were considered personal and virtually never discussed. I attended a Catholic grade school and continued with religion classes through high school. I was a good student and knew what I was supposed to believe – but no matter how hard I tried, I … Continue reading Evidence in the Flesh for Apologetics

Reformed Libertarianism: An Alternative to Guillaume Bignon

A few months ago, my friend Tim Stratton at FreeThinking Ministries asked me to write a piece responding to Guillaume Bignon’s form of exhaustive deterministic Calvinism. Bignon is a compatibilist; that is, he is someone who believes that the propositions “God determines all things” and “human beings are free in the morally relevant sense” are … Continue reading Reformed Libertarianism: An Alternative to Guillaume Bignon

The Freedom to Trick God?

Question: Dear Dr. Tim, On Molinism, once God instantiates the world which he knows agent Agent P will freely choose ‘x’ at ‘t’, Agent P will freely choose ‘x’ at ‘t’. It seems to me that this isn’t a categorical freedom but only freedom in the sense that ‘if God had instantiated a different world … Continue reading The Freedom to Trick God?