I recently posted the Nuremberg Argument on the FreeThinking Ministries Facebook page:
1- If the Nazis were properly convicted at Nuremberg, then God exists.
2- The Nazis were properly convicted at Nuremberg.
3- Therefore, God exists.
I also shared this short video.
The Nuremberg argument I shared is sound because proper convictions are based upon truth. If Chief Justice Jackson’s case – which was sufficient to convict the Nazis – was based upon false premises, then the Nazis were improperly convicted. However, anyone who rejects premise (2) is probably not fit to live with other human beings. It seems obviously true. To reject it is to side with the Nazis.[1] Indeed, one is not irrational for affirming this premise. Thus, if both premises are true, then it is rational to affirm the conclusion and affirm the existence of God.
If one disagrees then one is tacitly affirming that the Nazis were improperly and wrongly convicted at Nuremberg. That’s a heavy burden to bear. That’s an extremely expensive price tag. Are you willing to pay it? Make no mistake, the atheist who claims that humanity was not created on purpose or for a specific purpose, and that there is no “LAW above the law” in which humanity ought to correspond (and can correspond) – finds himself paying that expensive price and siding with the Nazis!
Here’s the deal: If racism is really wrong (as opposed to mere personal opinion), and humans have the power to not be racist, then God exists. If kidnapping, rape, and murder are all objectively wrong – no matter what anyone subjectively thinks to the contrary – and humans possess the power to refrain from kidnapping, raping, or murdering other humans, then God exists. It seems intuitive, properly basic, and that most humans possess a direct awareness that Nazism, communism, racism, kidnapping, rape, and murder are really wrong in an objective sense and that humanity has the power and ability to refrain from these objective evils.
Therefore, God exists.
The Nuremberg Argument sparked a spirited exchange of ideas with a professor and outspoken atheist on social media named Ryan Downie. Please enjoy reading what followed below. For the sake of clarity, his words are blue:
RYAN DOWNIE: Objective morality can exist even if God does not. So this argument is unsound.
TIM STRATTON: If atheism is true, then we are an accident of nature and determined by nature. If that’s the case, so much for objective moral purpose or obligation.
Abstract objects get ya nothing.
RYAN: This is irrelevant. All that matters is if there are moral properties and facts. Being intentional creations is irrelevant. Further, abstract objects absolutely can solve the issue. They don’t need to be causal.
TIM: These “facts” you refer to — if atheism is true — is that there is no objective purpose for humanity, nor does humanity have any power to attain any subjective purpose (or correspond with any particular abstract object). That’s far from irrelevant. Indeed, as I’ve written elsewhere, it’s anything but a robust sense of morality (See, New and Improved Deductive Moral Arguments).
However, if Christianity is true, we do have robust morality in that God created humanity on purpose and for the specific purpose of love since love is necessary, eternal without beginning, and fundamental to ultimate reality of the triune God (See Adam Johnson’s Divine Love Theory). Moreover, God gives humanity libertarian freedom so that we can choose to use this power to correspond to reality and live according to the objective purpose of life . . . or not.
This is what breathes fire into the Moral Argument!
On top of all of that, there are really good arguments against the existence of abstract objects, not that they would work for a robust sense of objective morality anyway (see the William Lane Craig vs Eric Wielenberg debate).
Bottom line: atheism does not have access to objective moral purpose or the power of humanity to live according to a purpose or not. Christian theism, on the other hand, offers both of these key ingredients of a robust sense of morality.
RYAN: This is false as it ignores views like those proposed by Philip Goff wherein there are certain inherently teleological aspect to reality despite God not existing. That said, I find it bizarre to think that some externally imposed purpose for humanity is needed for morality to be objective. Rather, what matters are the reasons we have for acting. Being created by any being for a purpose does not make morality objective in the sense you need. Sure, it would be objectively the case that some being had intention X in creating, but that does not give any objective morality. If fact, said intention may be good or bad itself. What you have proposed is actually subjective morality determined by the subject God. Of course, there is a *sense* in which one could think of it as objective, but it would be arbitrary. It’s certainly no more robust than godless normative realism.
Like all apologists regarding this matter, you’re pushing tired arguments that are just wrong. Swinburne gets it. I wish more apologists would be like him. Morality is either objective or not completely independently of whether or not God exists.
TIM: How did you reach the conclusion that I’ve “ignored Goff”? Not only have I previously interacted with Goff’s views, I am currently editing a forthcoming volume where defeaters are offered against Goff’s view. Stay tuned.
Now, if you think Goff’s view is going to get you out of this mess, then you’ve got to posit that conscious particles are somehow aware of immaterial abstract objects, more outrageous, that instead of “God is love” (1 John 4:8), that “particles are love.” Then, to make things even more silly, these particles chose to create humanity on purpose and for a specific purpose to love their neighbors as themselves . . . and then these magical particles endowed humanity — a purely physical thing — with the libertarian freedom to choose to love, or do otherwise.
As Kirk Durston has pointed out, this is “the fantasy of the gaps!”
One thing that Goff noted is that his view gives libertarian freedom a shot on naturalism. Indeed, I have argued that consciousness is a necessary condition for libertarian free-thinking, but it is not sufficient to provide libertarian free-thinking. However, Goff is still quite skeptical that this kind of freedom is compatible with his worldview (so am I). Indeed, one of the world’s greatest advocates for Goff’s view of panpsychism is Galen Strawson. He believes not only that we do not possess libertarian freedom, but that libertarian freedom is logically impossible (I’ve responded to Strawson on my website).
If this is the case, panpsychism might fall prey to a version of the FreeThinking Argument as consciousness alone does not entail libertarian freedom. After all, Calvinist determinists believe that humans possess intentional states of conscious awareness, but they maintain that everything we think of and about — and the manner in which we experience sensations of deliberations (leading to all of our beliefs) — is determined by antecedent conditions (see my co-authored paper with JP Moreland on the problems with that view: An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument.)
You said that you “find it bizarre to think that some externally imposed purpose for humanity is needed for morality to be objective.” I find your beliefs on this matter bizarre. After all, if a necessarily triune and loving God exists and created humanity on purpose and for the specific purpose to love, then there would be objective facts about humanity irrespective of the subjective opinions from humanity.
You added that you thought all that “matters are the reasons we have for acting.”
This is an old and tired response that has been defeated a long time ago. For starters, see the paper I co-authored with JP Moreland (linked above). After all, if one does not possess the libertarian freedom to think, then one is not in control of the manner in which one reasons. One can never actively do their due diligence or be more careful while thinking things through. That would all be determined by mindless stuff, or conscious particles who deceive all people (if Goff’s view is true), or a deity of deception (if Calvinism is true).
One can reason well, or poorly. So, mere “reasons one has for acting” are irrelevant if the manner in which one experienced sensations of reason were determined by mindless or deceptive stuff or beings. People believe things for horrible reasons all the time. People act based upon bad reasoning all the time. The question is not if one has “reasons for acting,” it is this: does one have power over the manner in which one reasons? If one does not possess the libertarian freedom to think, then it follows that something or someone else determines the manner in which one experiences sensations of reasonings. But this, as Moreland and I explained, will lead to defeat and epistemic meltdown.
You asserted that “Being created by any being for a purpose does not make morality objective in the sense you need,” but this is false, As I noted above, if God created humanity for the purpose of love (and to reflect the necessary nature of objective and ultimate reality), then there would be objective facts about humanity irrespective of the subjective opinions from humanity.
You replied: “Sure, it would be objectively the case that some being had intention X in creating, but that does not give any objective morality.”
Consider this: if an inventor invented a hammer for the purpose of hammering nails, then it would be an objective fact of the matter that the hammer’s purpose of existence is to pound nails (as opposed to screwing screws — that’s the purpose of screw drivers). Now suppose the absurd hypotesis of panspsychism is true and the hammer is conscious. If the conscious hammer has a desire to screw screws, as opposed to fulfilling its objective purpose, then the hammer is objectively wrong. That is to say, the hammer’s desires do not correspond to ultimate reality. As Ben Shapiro would say, “the facts don’t care about the hammer’s feelings.”
This is what grounds morality. After all, if humanity is an accident of nature and determined by nature, then we have no target we ought to hit, and no control over what we hit. On Christian theism however, we were created to hit the target of love, and God gave us the power to hit that target or to miss the mark (sin) in an objective sense.
You said that what I have proposed is “actually subjective morality determined by the subject God.”
That’s false. Again, I encourage you to read Adam Lloyd Johnson’s Divine Love Theory. On that view, the triune God who “is love” (1 John 4:8) exists necessarily. Thus, love is more fundamental to reality than the physical universe. It’s not up to God if He is going to love or not — that’s just who He is (read my book: Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism).
Now, creation is up to God and exists contingently, but if God creates, He cannot (or would not) create a world in which love is not possible or in which love was not the purpose.
Bottom line: on Christian theism, particularly, it is objectively true that love corresponds to ultimate and necessary reality (without beginning). This is not up to the triune God anymore than God’s triune nature is up to the Trinity. God cannot create a fourth person of the Godhead, and God cannot NOT love.
You noted that “there is a *sense* in which one could think of it as objective, but it would be arbitrary,” but this is also false. Indeed, it’s not arbitrary at all. It’s just consistent with the Bible and perfect being theology.
You also said that this view is “certainly no more robust than godless normative realism.,” but that’s demonstrably false. Godless normative realism has no access to the objective purpose of humanity, has a hard time (if not impossible) making sense of the libertarian freedom of humanity, and has no room for the ultimate praise or punishment of how humans live (we all reach the same fate). This is not true, however, if Christianity is true. Christian theism is far more robust that “godless normative realism.” As I’ve previously written in Objective Morality VS David Pallman:
“If Wielenberg’s view, for example, were true — even if it could account for abstract objective moral values — why should anyone care? So what if some things are objectively wrong to do according to abstract objects? We are all just going to die anyway. And who cares about legacy either? Eventually the entire universe is going to suffer a cosmic heat death (there will be no heat, no light, and no life anywhere in the entire universe) and ultimately “no one will remember your name” or any of the so-called moral actions you performed.
In the end, this atheistic attempt to account for objective morality is fairly useless. After all, what good is a moral theory if it (i) cannot account for objective moral purpose, (ii) does not provide an ability to attain a specific moral standard, or (iii) provides no reason for a person to act morally?
It’s an utterly bankrupt account of morality.”
With all of the above data in mind, consider the Ultimate Moral Argument.
The Ultimate Moral Argument (UMA)
1- If God does not exist, then humanity is an accident of nature and completely determined by nature.
2- If humanity is an accident of nature and completely determined by nature, then there is (i) no objective purpose to human existence, (ii) humans have no control over their behavior, and (iii) there are no ultimate consequences for human behavior.
3- If there is (i) no objective purpose to human existence, (ii) humans have no control over their behavior, and (iii) there are no ultimate consequences for human behavior, then objective moral obligations are illusory.
4- Objective moral obligations are not illusory. (Chief Justice Jackson was right; there is a Law above the law in which Hitler and the Nazis were supposed to adhere and had the power to adhere, but they failed.)
5- Therefore, there is (i) an objective purpose to human life, (ii) humans have control over their behavior, and (iii) there are ultimate consequences for human behavior.
6- Therefore, humanity is not an accident of nature and completely determined by nature.
7- Therefore, God exists.
You said that I was “pushing tired arguments that are just wrong,” but these are anything but tired, and they are based upon defensible premises that seem true. Indeed, I’ve offered new approaches to the matter and working with two of the leading scholars on this topic including David Baggett and Adam Lloyd Johnson. I personally reject Divine Command Theory and have offered something compatible with Divine Love Theory by marrying it with objective purpose.
With this approach, divine commands do not ground morality, but merely place humanity in an epistemic position to know ultimate reality and the objective purpose of human existence. Until this new approach is dealt with, then you are not dealing with Stratton’s view.
According to the model I am advancing, God is required for robust sense or morality as the triune God grounds necessary love, the objective purpose of humanity, the power of humanity to choose to approximate to the objective purpose (or not), and there is ultimate praise and punishment for our choice to approximate to ultimate reality and objective purpose. On atheism or any “godless” view, these essential ingredients to a robust moral theory are noticeably absent.
RYAN: I think you are making many mistakes here. First, libertarian freedom is not needed and is very likely incoherent. Second, you say “if God created humanity for the purpose of love (and to reflect the necessary nature of objective reality), then there would be objective facts about humanity irrespective of the subjective opinions from humanity.” While true, they are not moral facts. There would simply be an objective fact about the purpose or intention God had for making humans. Whether this purpose is good or not depends on inherent properties. In the case of love, it depends on the nature of love itself, not the fact that God is loving. Love would be good whether or not God existed.
You said that “If an inventor invented a hammer for the purpose of hammering nails, then it would be objectively true that the purpose of the hammer is to pound nails (as opposed to screwing screws — that’s the purpose of screw drivers). Thus, if the conscious hammer (on panpsychism) has a desire to screw screws as opposed to fulfilling its objective purpose, then the hammer is objectively wrong.”
Nope. It would only be objectively true that the hammer was *originally* intended by the inventor to hammer nails. That’s not a normative fact. It’s a fact about what the inventor had in mind. If the hammer decided to have a different purpose, that wouldn’t make it wrong. It would only be wrong if the hammer said its inventor intended it to for some other purpose. Nevertheless, the hammer may find that it is perfectly good at doing something other than hammering nails and it may find purpose in that.
“After all, if humanity is an accident of nature and determined by nature, then we have no target we ought to hit, and no control over what we hit.”
Nature doesn’t have to be, and likely isn’t, completely deterministic. Again, an externally imposed purpose isn’t needed. What matters are reasons, even if we might reason poorly at times.
“On Christian theism however, we were created to hit the target of love, and God gave us the power to hit that target or to miss the mark (sin) in an objective sense.”
Again, so what? This is arbitrary in the sense that it’s based on what a subject desires or aspects of some subject. This doesn’t make the purpose or target good. That will depend on inherent properties of the target.
Bottom line, you haven’t even come close to showing that godless normative realism is less robust than theistic morality. In fact, I think it is definitively the other way around. You’re the one with the mess who has to posit all sorts of bizarre and outrageous metaphysics. These aren’t so much new approaches as repackaging and insisting that your specific religious views are somehow fundamental and necessary.
TIM: Thanks for your further comments, Ryan. You began by saying that you think that I am making many mistakes here. Well, I think you’re making many mistakes here. Now, if we do not possess the libertarian freedom to think, then you are left with mindless or deceptive stuff that knows nothing about metaphysics determining your views about metaphysics. This provides an undercutting defeater to everything you’ve said (since we are discussing metaphysics).
See my recent debate with Alex Malpass on this topic and consider an argument:
1. The philosopher’s belief that he does not possess libertarian freedom is either (i) determined by mindless stuff, (ii) determined by deceptive beings, (iii) completely random, or (iv) because he possesses libertarian freedom.
2. The philosopher’s belief that he does not possess libertarian freedom is not determined by mindless stuff, determined by deceptive beings, or completely random.
3. Therefore, the philosopher’s belief that he does not possess libertarian freedom is because he possesses libertarian freedom.
For a defense of these premises, I point you to the paper I coauthored with J.P. Moreland entitled, “An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument” (see link above). With that said, this new and evolved version of the argument highlights the fact that it is self-defeating to reject the libertarian freedom to think.
With that in mind, you offered a self-defeating statement when you said, “libertarian freedom is not needed and is very likely incoherent.”
Au contraire! It is needed to have justified inferred metaphysical beliefs. If it’s incoherent, then you could never know it, or anything else regarding metaphysics — including issues pertaining to morality.
I noted that if God created humanity for the purpose of love (and to reflect the necessary nature of objective reality), then there would be objective facts about humanity irrespective of the subjective opinions from humanity. In response, you said: “While true, they are not moral facts.”
You miss the point, Ryan (btw: thank you for agreeing with the main point).
A moral fact, according to this model I’ve offered, simply refers to the degree in which one corresponds to both ultimate reality and the objective purpose of human life (it’s all about love if Christian theism in particular is true). Let me say it again: you must read Divine Love Theory by Adam Lloyd Johnson.
Regarding the model I’ve advanced, you said, “there would simply be an objective fact about the purpose or intention God had for making humans.”
Amen to that! Preach it, brother! Thus, when humans freely choose to “miss that mark” (sin), then this is what morality is referring to.
You said, “Whether this purpose is good or not depends on inherent properties.”
To be clear, Ryan, I’ve said nothing about “goodness.” I merely noted that the objective purpose of humanity is LOVE. With that in mind, you said, “in the case of love, it depends on the nature of love itself, not the fact that God is loving. Love would be good whether or not God existed.”
That’s not my case, Ryan. Again, I don’t care about “goodness.” I simply note that if Christian theism is true, then love is necessary and fundamental to reality. On my view, love is eternal in the past without beginning. Moreover, according to Christian theism, we would have also been created on purpose and for the specific purpose to love all people (from neighbors to those who consider us to be enemies). So, we can freely choose to correspond to objective reality and the objective purpose of human existence . . . or not. When we choose the latter, we literally miss the mark (the definition of sin) in an objective sense.
I noted that if an inventor invented a hammer for the purpose of hammering nails, then it would be objectively true that the purpose of the hammer is to pound nails (as opposed to screwing screws — that’s the purpose of screw drivers). Thus, if the conscious hammer (this is not a crazy idea since you have already offered panpsychism as a possibility) has a desire to screw screws as opposed to fulfilling its objective purpose, then the hammer is objectively wrong and opposes the reality of the situation in which the hammer found itself. In response, you said,
“Nope. It would only be objectively true that the hammer was *originally* intended by the inventor to hammer nails.”
Yes, and the inventor designed it for a specific purpose. That cannot change no matter how badly the hammer wants to be a screwdriver. Thus, if the hammer chose to act in a manner that opposes the designer’s creative intent and design plan, then the hammer is opposing reality and it’s objective purpose. The hammer would be rejecting the purpose in which it was designed and the purpose that would allow it, hammers, screws, wood, and so much more to flourish.
It’s just plain objectively insane to use hammers to screw screws. It’s intelligent, prudent, and wise to use hammers to pound nails. To do otherwise is to use its design for something that it was not made for — which will cause objective damage to the screw, the wood, and more.
In response you brought up “normative facts,” but I am talking about the creative intent and design plan — the purpose — of the transcendent inventor (who, in Christian theism — is also perfectly intelligent). It’s just plain stupid (in an objective sense) to oppose the objective purpose and design plan of a perfectly intelligent inventor who loves the hammer. To attack anything other than my argument is to attack a straw man.
You said, “If the hammer decided to have a different purpose, that wouldn’t make it wrong. It would only be wrong if the hammer said its inventor intended it to for some other purpose.”
The hammer would be both opposed to reality which would make it objectively stupid. Have you ever tried to use a hammer to screw screws? It doesn’t work well at all. Screw drivers are much better (and they were not designed to pound nails).
You said, “Nevertheless, the hammer may find that it is perfectly good at doing something other than hammering nails and it may find purpose in that.” As I noted above, it won’t be “good” at screwing screws into wood. It might subjectively find a subjective purpose in trying to screw screws, but it’s not the objective purpose in which it exists and which it was supposed to find fulfillment. Instead, the hammer is choosing to oppose its objective purpose of existence. This is not only objectively stupid, but it will cause damage to the screws and wood.
I pointed out that if atheism is true, then “humanity is an accident of nature and determined by nature. If that’s the case, then we have no target we are supposed to hit or that we ought to hit. Moreover, we would have no control over what we hit. In response you replied: “Nature doesn’t have to be, and likely isn’t, completely deterministic.”
No, but as JP Moreland and I explained in the paper referenced above, all things about humanity would be determined by the laws and events of nature (even if the quantum realm is not deterministic). If you do not possess the libertarian freedom to think, then as I noted in the above argument, your mental activity is either determined by something mindless, something deceptive, or just plain random — all of which are untrustworthy.
I digress . . . I’ve simply noted that on atheism, there is no objective purpose to humanity. On Christian theism, however, there is objective purpose and its LOVE.
You replied: “What matters are reasons, even if we might reason poorly at times.”
Ryan, you are helping yourself to libertarian language to reject libertarian freedom. I can’t say this enough: read An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument. Here’s the deal, on your view, reasoning happens to you, and it is determined by mindless, deceptive, or random stuff. On my view, we are active reasoners (as opposed to passive cogs), who have the power to pilot the ship and determine how — the manner in which — we reason.
How you experience sensations of reason is not up to you on your view. It’s determined by mindless, deceptive, or random stuff. That’s reason to doubt your so-called “reasons.”
I said, “On Christian theism however, we were created to hit the target of love, and God gave us the power to hit that target or to miss the mark (sin) in an objective sense.”
Your response: “. . . so what?”
Well, this provides an objective basis for objective purpose (which atheism does not have) and a foundation for moral obligations to live according to objective reality — or not. That’s pretty dang robust . . . and atheism does not have access to these vital ingredients.
You said, “This is arbitrary in the sense that it’s based on what a subject desires or aspects of some subject. This doesn’t make the purpose or target good.”
There you go again, Ryan. I’m not arguing for “good,” I’m arguing for love (if it’s good or not). If Christianity is true, then it’s anything but arbitrary as the Bible is clear that “God is love” and exists eternally without beginning. As I pointed out above, this means that if Christianity is true, LOVE exists eternally without beginning. It’s fundamental to objective and ontological reality. God creates humans on purpose and for the specific purpose to correspond to reality. He gives us the freedom to reject reality, or to correspond to reality (to do otherwise would be to erase the best kind of love). This grounds objective facts about humanity irrespective of the subjective opinions from humanity.
You said, “. . . you haven’t even come close to showing that godless normative realism is less robust than theistic morality.”
Besides the facts that I have demonstrated that on godless normative realism:
- Humanity was not created on purpose or for the specific purpose of love. On Christianity, however, humanity was created on purpose and for the specific purpose of love.
- Humanity is determined by mindless stuff or deceptive particles (or it’s just plain random). On Christianity, however, this is not the case. We are created in the likeness of God (Genesis 1:26), and have the power to take our thoughts captive (2 Cor 10:5) before bad thinking takes us (Col 2:8).
You said, “You’re the one with the mess who has to posit all sorts of bizarre and outrageous metaphysics.”
Positing one maximally great being is hardly bizarre, Ryan (especially since there is a plethora of arguments for God’s existence with defensible premises). In fact, your view is an extremely minority position that advances the idea that atoms are conscious thinking things and that an infinite amount of abstract objects actually exist in some other realm. I simply posit one God. You posit conscious particles and an infinite amount of abstract objects in a different realm all to avoid God.
As I noted above: your view commits the “fantasy of the gaps” fallacy.
RYAN: I think your responses is honestly a mess. You take pains to say you aren’t talking about normativity and goodness, just purpose. You then say these are necessary ingredients for morality that atheism can’t help itself to. This is just wrong. Even if one agrees that there is no objective purpose imposed on us on atheism, it doesn’t follow that there is no objective morality on atheism. It will simply be understood differently, that is, in non purposive terms.
Second, you kind of butchered the hammer example. You kept referring to turning screws. But pounding nails and turning screws are not the only options. A hammer could perfectly well serve functions different from both of those, and no, it would not be objectively stupid or harmful. That’s really silly.
Finally, your view IS arbitrary. Why should anyone care what some other being’s purpose is for us? Why should we define morality in terms of that being’s purpose even if it did make us with that intention? You could say that failing to do so will be harmful in some way, but you’d have to specify how and why that’s bad. That would be more a prudential issue than a moral one.
As for libertarian free will, I continue to maintain that it is incoherent, and no, that is not self-defeating. I think the options you list are confused and actually not exhaustive. You also seem to rely on a confused sense of what a person is on a compatibilist view. This would take a fair amount of unpacking, but again… I don’t know how long you want to keep going, so I’ll stop here for now.
TIM: Okay, so you think my responses are “honestly a mess,” and I think yours is a mess. Now what?
You noted that I am focused on purpose (after all, this is called divine purpose theory) and that this is not available to the atheist, but then you asserted that I was “just wrong.” You followed that by saying: “Even if one agrees that there is no objective purpose imposed on us on atheism, it doesn’t follow that there is no objective morality on atheism.”
You miss the point again, Ryan. Even if you help yourself to the fantasy of the gaps that an abstract realm exists with an infinite amount of immaterial causally effete objects and that atoms are consciously aware, you still do not get a target that conscious beings are actually supposed to hit and that we actually have the power to hit. Thus, according to this fantasy, you are never responsible for missing any marks (which is what it means to sin). Yet, you want to refer to this fantasy as “robust.” That’s silly.
You said, “It will simply be understood differently, that is, in non purposive terms.”
And this different understanding makes all the difference in the world, Ryan. As I’ve written elsewhere:
“Moreover, if Wielenberg’s view, for example, were true — even if it could account for abstract objective moral values — why should anyone care? So what if some things are objectively wrong to do according to abstract objects? We are all just going to die anyway. And who cares about legacy either? Eventually the entire universe is going to suffer a cosmic heat death (there will be no heat, no light, and no life anywhere in the entire universe) and ultimately “no one will remember your name” or any of the so-called ‘moral actions’ you performed.
In the end, this atheistic attempt to account for objective morality is fairly useless. After all, what good is a moral theory if it (i) cannot account for objective moral purpose, (ii) does not provide an ability to attain a specific moral standard, or (iii) provides no reason for a person to act morally? It’s an utterly bankrupt account of morality.”
With all of the above data in mind, consider the Ultimate Moral Argument (UMA):
1- If God does not exist, then humanity is an accident of nature and completely determined by nature.
2- If humanity is an accident of nature and completely determined by nature, then there is (i) no objective purpose to human existence, (ii) humans have no control over their behavior, and (iii) there are no ultimate consequences for human behavior.
3- If there is (i) no objective purpose to human existence, (ii) humans have no control over their behavior, and (iii) there are no ultimate consequences for human behavior, then objective moral obligations are illusory.
4- Objective moral obligations are not illusory. (Chief Justice Jackson was right; there is a Law above the law in which Hitler and the Nazis were supposed to adhere and had the power to adhere, but they failed.)
5- Therefore, there is (i) an objective purpose to human life, (ii) humans have control over their behavior, and (iii) there are ultimate consequences for human behavior.
6- Therefore, humanity is not an accident of nature and completely determined by nature.
7- Therefore, God exists.
You said that I “butchered the hammer example.” You said that “pounding nails and turning screws are not the only options. A hammer could perfectly well serve functions different from both of those, and no, it would not be objectively stupid or harmful.”
You are right in that hammers can be used to kill people too (they work well for that kind of thing — that’s why it’s Thor’s weapon of choice). However, you are ignoring the point of the illustration. If the intelligent inventor’s creative intent and design plan for the tool is to pound nails, and he also invents a different tool to screw screws, then it’s just plain stupid to attempt to use a hammer to screw screws or for a screw driver to pound nails. The construction worker who does such things misses the mark of the purpose of these tools, is just plain stupid, will fail to build a sturdy building, and will get fired and ultimately not be employed by any construction business.
You said that my view is arbitrary and asked, “Why should anyone care what some other being’s purpose is for us?”
Here’s what I’ve written elsewhere:
“If one does not wish to ‘resemble the Trinity’ as Dr. Adam Lloyd Johnson has described in his book, Divine Love Theory; if one does not wish to live according to the Law of Christ (which is the law above the law) and God’s purpose for humanity — to always love all people — then, they are free to spend eternity apart from God’s loving plan. They are free to do things their own way for eternity and not love others or experience love in return. Jesus referred to this love-free state of affairs as hell.”
Ultimately, one is free to choose to not correspond to reality for eternity. That means that one is free to be objectively stupid into the eternal future. If that’s what you want, God gives you the freedom to be stupid and to choose to not live in a community where everyone is committed to loving God and all others. You are free to live as you want to, Ryan. Feel free to not love God and all others into the infinite future. Feel free to keep screwing screws with your hammer every day to infinity and beyond. In the meantime, you might want to read CS Lewis’ “The Great Divorce.”
You asked, “Why should we define morality in terms of that being’s purpose even if it did make us with that intention?”
It’s not only God’s creative intent, design plan, and purpose for humanity, as I noted above, it’s even deeper than that . . . love is necessary, eternal without beginning, and fundamental to ultimate reality on Christian theism because of the eternal love of the Trinity. So, when one loves, they correspond to ultimate reality and resemble the necessary love of the Triune God. When one chooses to miss the objective mark of love, they are evil.
I once had a passing conversation with Gary DeWeese in a hallway at Biola. He said something along these lines:
“To a degree that one approximates to the objective standard of love, to that same degree one is good. To a degree that one falls short of the objective standard of love, to that same degree one is evil.”
You said that I could say that “failing to do so will be harmful in some way, but you’d have to specify how and why that’s bad.”
Perhaps, but that’s not what I’ve done here, Ryan. God simply allows people to choose to correspond to the objective mark of love . . . or let’s them and allows them the freedom to choose to be stupid and evil for as long as they’d like — even into the eternal future. In eternity, those who choose to love get to be citizens of heaven. Those who choose to be stupid and oppose ultimate reality get to live somewhere else. You get to have it your way, bro. God will not force you into His presence.
You said, “As for libertarian free will, I continue to maintain that it is incoherent…”
Well, Ryan, if you reject libertarian freedom, then please tell us what exactly is determining your belief that you do not have libertarian freedom. If it is mindless, deceptive, or random, then defeaters abound and are raised against your belief that you do not possess libertarian freedom. Thus, your belief is not justified (it is not a rational belief). Let’s review the argument once again:
1. The philosopher’s belief that he does not possess libertarian freedom is either (i) determined by mindless stuff, (ii) determined by deceptive beings, (iii) completely random, or (iv) because he possesses libertarian freedom.
2. The philosopher’s belief that he does not possess libertarian freedom is not determined by mindless stuff, determined by deceptive beings, or completely random.
3. Therefore, the philosopher’s belief that he does not possess libertarian freedom is because he possesses libertarian freedom.
As noted above, to see a defense of these premises, please read the paper I coauthored with J.P. Moreland. With that said, this version of the argument highlights the fact that it is self-defeating to reject the libertarian freedom to think.
In response you asserted: “. . . and no, that is not self-defeating.”
I offered an argument and have defended the premises at length in my published work. I have shown exactly why it’s self-defeating to reject libertarian freedom and your response is “nuh-uh!”
That’s not a rational response, Ryan. You said that you think the options I’ve listed are “confused and actually not exhaustive.” Well then why not add them here? All you need is one more option that won’t fall prey to what I’ve listed. Where is it?
Finally, you finished by appealing to compatibilism and said that I “seem to rely on a confused sense of what a person is on a compatibilist view.”
I think the confusion is on your foot, Ryan. I’ve published peer-reviewed articles on this subject and offered many more website article and videos (feel free to peruse my website and YouTube channel). In the literature, compatibilism is typically understood as “the thesis that some kind of freedom and/or moral responsibility is compatible with determinism.”
The above argument I’ve offered says nothing about “moral responsibility,” but is focused on metaphysical beliefs. The co-authored paper I wrote with JP Moreland shows that epistemic responsibility is not compatible with determinism. So, to counter, “but I’m a compatibilist,” is silly. It does not work since we showed that epistemic responsibility is INCOMPATIBLE with determinism.
Thank you for the conversation.
Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),
Dr. Tim Stratton
Notes
[1] Of course, this is given that there were no procedural errors, which would cast doubt on whether or not the Nazi’s were “properly” convicted.” It’s also worth noting that some may not side with the Nazis in the sense of approving of their actions, but they nevertheless fail to uphold justice in failing to identify what they did as morally condemnable.
