Are the Doors of Hell Locked from the Inside?

Introduction C. S. Lewis claimed that the doors of hell are locked from the inside.[i] In this article, I provide an argument to support Lewis’ claim. I also discuss the apologetic significance of his assertion. Assumptions I assume that free will exists and that human beings have libertarian freedom. I also assume the moral principle … Continue reading Are the Doors of Hell Locked from the Inside?

Socratic Dialogue on Postmodernism

Preface As Nicholas Rescher notes in Chapter 3 of Metaphilosophy: Philosophy in Philosophical Perspective, philosophy can be articulated in several ways, including the essay, the medieval scholastic treatise, and the dialogue format. In what follows, I provide a philosophical evaluation of postmodernism using the dialogue format. In honor of the first masters of dialogue – … Continue reading Socratic Dialogue on Postmodernism

Why Anselm’s Argument in Chapter 2 of Proslogium has Modal Significance

It is commonly held that Anselm’s argument in Chapter 2 of Proslogium is not a modally-significant argument, but that his argument in Chapter 3 possesses such significance. For example, in the first paragraph of Anselm’s Neglected Argument, Brian Leftow refers to the argument in Chapter 2 as “non-modal” and to the argument in Chapter 3 … Continue reading Why Anselm’s Argument in Chapter 2 of Proslogium has Modal Significance

Does Anselm’s Ontological Argument in Proslogium Two Presuppose that Existence is a Property?

Introduction In this article, I will briefly argue for the following theses: (a) it is not clear that Anselm’s ontological argument in Chapter Two of Proslogium presupposes that existence is a property, and (b) Anselm’s argument presupposes that objectivity and subjectivity are properties. Argument It is commonly held that, in Chapter Two of Proslogium, Anselm … Continue reading Does Anselm’s Ontological Argument in Proslogium Two Presuppose that Existence is a Property?

Philosophical Notes on the Underground: Three

“More than that: you say that then science itself will teach man (though this, to my mind, is already a luxury) that he really does not possess, and never did possess, either a will or a whim of his own; that he is, in fact, no more than a kind of piano key or organ … Continue reading Philosophical Notes on the Underground: Three

The Kalam Cosmological Argument, Part One

Introduction The kalam cosmological argument is both historically and currently significant. William Lane Craig, the leading contemporary advocate of the argument, has dubbed it the kalam argument in recognition of its origin in the work of Medieval Muslim philosophers such as al-Ghazali.[1] The argument continues to interest philosophers and theologians. Its structure is simple: Whatever … Continue reading The Kalam Cosmological Argument, Part One

Philosophical Notes on the Underground: Two

I closed Note One by calling Underground Man “grouchy.”[1] That is an understatement. The man admits to being spiteful. He hates his neighbors, practices cruelty, and delights in the misfortune of others. He even claims to take pleasure in his own pain and bitterness, some of which is self-induced. For example: “I reached a point … Continue reading Philosophical Notes on the Underground: Two

Philosophical Notes on the Underground: One

“Meaningless! Meaningless!” says the Teacher. “Utterly meaningless! Everything is meaningless.” (Ecclesiastes 1:2)   In Part 1 of Notes from Underground, Dostoyevsky’s Underground Man claims that consciousness is a disease.[1] In a loose sense, given certain assumptions, Underground Man makes a significant point. In a strict sense, however, he is wrong. Let me explain. First, we … Continue reading Philosophical Notes on the Underground: One