Although Richard Dawkins has advanced atheism – arguably more than anyone else – his arguments against the existence of God are simply horrible. In fact, Dawkins seems to be quite proud of what he refers to as the “central argument” of his book, The God Delusion.[1] His central argument, however, is the epitome of an unsound argument. That is to say, his conclusion “Therefore, God probably does not exist,” does not logically follow from his premises.
Dawkins’s central argument goes like this:
1. One of the greatest challenges to the human intellect has been to explain how the complex, improbable appearance of design in the universe arises.
2. The natural temptation is to attribute the appearance of design to actual design itself.
3. The temptation is a false one because the designer hypothesis immediately raises the larger problem of who designed the designer.
4. The most ingenious and powerful explanation is Darwinian evolution by natural selection.
5. We don’t have an equivalent explanation for physics.
6. We should not give up the hope of a better explanation arising in physics, something as powerful as Darwinism is for biology.
7. Therefore, God almost certainly does not exist. (Those are his words.)
William Lane Craig responds:
Now the argument is jarring because the atheistic conclusion, “Therefore, God almost certainly does not exist,” just comes at you suddenly out of left field. You don’t need to be a philosopher to realize that that conclusion does not follow from those six previous statements. In fact, if we take these six statements to be premises of an argument leading to the conclusion, “Therefore, God almost certainly does not exist,” then Dawkins’ argument is patently invalid. There are simply no logical rules of inference that would permit you to deduce this conclusion from those six premises.
Ultimately, since the key and central argument of The God Delusion fails, Dawkins’s 464-page book can be safely ignored because, as Craig notes, “if Dawkins’s central argument fails, then his book is hollow at its center.”[2]
Now, because Dawkins’s self-described “central argument” of The God Delusion is a dismal failure, it provides reason to dismiss his entire project (which has often been described as the “Bible of Atheism”).
The Molinism Delusion?
Similarly, not long ago, a well-read high school teacher wrote a 300-page on-line document critiquing my published book, Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism. Indeed, it sought to show that one of my main points (not to be confused with the central argument of my book — that Mere Molinism provides the best explanation of all the data) was flawed.[3]
I have skimmed much of this monstrous on-line document – I even printed it off to read it more efficiently – and it is only “Part 1” of his review! [4] Be that as it may, this critic has suggested that one of the most important and central themes of his critique, that is threaded throughout the entirety of this extremely long document, is something he refers to as the “Mere Molinism Dilemma.”
The author seems quite proud of this dilemma. If he’s right, perhaps my 300-page book should be dismissed. If his dilemma is a failure, however, then his 300 pages objecting to Mere Molinism would be “hollow at the center” and thus, should be dismissed.
Let’s examine my critic’s case. On page 190 of his document, he offers what he refers to as “the gist” of the Mere Molinist Dilemma:
Mere Molinist Dilemma: Either the agent while being determined unto salvation is A) not rationally responsible, or B) rationally responsible. If horn A), then [Stratton’s] EDD definition is a useless redundancy and its distinction between exhaustive and non-exhaustive would be proven superfluous. Incompatibilism would obtain and his project of mending Mere Molinism with Reformed theology would be quizzical. If horn B), then the debate against compatibilism would be surrendered. We can be free in a most relevant sense necessary for rational responsibility though we are determined.
He goes on to refer to the two so-called “horns” of this dilemma as A) the “Calvinist Horn,” and B) the “Freethinking Horn.”
He says that “if Stratton falls on the first horn, he would be throwing his Calvinist friends under the bus by assuming that one cannot both be rationally responsible (in the desert sense) and determined unto salvation at the same time.”
This critic follows by saying: “I contend that no Calvinist (except for maybe hyper-Calvinists) would accept that they are not free or responsible for their decision to follow Christ.”
Although “hyper-Calvinism” has historically meant an affirmation of something along the lines that God saves the elect through His sovereign power, it often brings an end to evangelism. It seems to me, however, that if a Calvinist affirms exhaustive divine determinism (EDD), they should also be a “hyper-Calvinist.” Although many Calvinists who affirm EDD would personally reject the hyper-Calvinist label (as does my critic), I don’t know how can one get more “hyper” than affirming that God determines ALL things about humanity? Indeed, this used to be my exact position (back in my EDD-Calvinist days as a pastor) and I was proud of it. I emphasized God’s sovereignty by affirming EDD, and thus, I rejected man’s responsibility in the work of salvation and everything else. Indeed, as a consistent EDD-Calvinist, I preached that no Christian was responsible — in any sense — for their salvation (or anything else).
Be that as it may, and more importantly, I am not claiming that Calvinists accept my argument. After all, that’s why they are Calvinists. I am, however, arguing that a loss of epistemic responsibility is entailed by their EDD view – if they realize and accept it or not. The mark of a sound argument is not whether or not one’s interlocutor accepts your argument. An argument is sound if it is structurally valid and the premises are true. If my arguments against Calvinism are objectively sound, it is simply irrelevant if a Calvinist subjectively accepts my argument.
The FreeThinking Horn
My critic then says, “if Stratton falls on the second horn, then he would have to forsake his FreeThinking Argument as one can be determined unto salvation and be rationally responsible (in the desert sense) at the same time.”
To be clear, I am not going to “give up the Free-Thinking Argument.” JP Moreland and I just co-authored a 30-page forthcoming paper explaining it, defending it, and concluding that epistemic responsibility is not compatible with the view that the critic affirms – that God determines ALL things about humanity. The “ALL things” includes, but is not limited to, each and every intuition, thought, judgment, evaluation, and all ensuing (theological) beliefs – including all of his wrong intuitions, bad judgements, incorrect evaluations, evil thoughts, and false (theological) beliefs that he is still determined to think are true.
None of these are up to the critic (or any other human) on this view of exhaustive divine determinism. All of these mental actions are all up to and causally determined by God (who thus turns out to be an untrustworthy deity of deception on my critic’s view).
The Calvinist Horn
So, if I evade the second horn of the dilemma, is the first horn going to impale me? Not at all.
The claim is that if I “fall on the first horn” then I “throw my Calvinist friends under the buss.” Well, what does that mean? Is “throwing a Calvinist under the bus” a logical fallacy that invalidates my argument that 5-Point Calvinism is logically compatible with Mere Molinism? Not at all. Moreover, is merely pointing out what logically follows from my friend’s incorrect beliefs equivalent to “throwing my friend under the bus”? If anything, I see what I am doing as pushing my Calvinist friend out of the way of the on-coming Mack Truck barreling toward him at full speed!
Anyway, arguing that if Calvinism is true then one is not rationally responsible (in a desert sense) for their salvation is exactly what I used to affirm as a “cage stage” Calvinist pastor who preached Calvinism from the pulpit . . . LEST NO MAN CAN BOAST (Ephesians 2:9)!
Indeed, according to Calvinism, the last thing a consistent Calvinist should seek to make room for is desert responsibility for any aspect of their salvation. After all, if one is rationally responsible for even a little bit of their salvation (in a desert sense), then this means that one deserves to be praised for their own salvation. But if one deserves to be praised for their own salvation, then one has grounds to boast.
That seems to be the last thing the Calvinist wants to affirm.
Ultimately, I suppose I choose to “fall” on horn A of the dilemma. Upon falling on this horn, however, I realize the horn is made of Nerf (and it actually massaged a sore muscle I had from doing too many push-ups the other day). This soft horn draws no blood.
Bottom line: One of the points I sought to communicate in my Mere Molinism book stands: Even if 5-Point Calvinism happens to be true and salvation is completely determined (and thus none of the elect are rationally responsible in a desert sense for their salvation), they still are rationally responsible when thinking things through in matters not pertaining to soteriological issues. Demonstrating that Calvinists are rationally responsible for things other than their own salvation is far from “throwing Calvinists under the bus.” Indeed, it is quite the opposite.
After all, even when Detective J. Warner Wallace was an atheist, for example, he was still free in a libertarian sense to think, judge, and evaluate evidence freely. Thus, he was quite rational when it came to solving cold-case murders. So, even if he could not apply this ability to “freely think” to salvation issues, he was still rationally responsible – and free in a libertarian sense – in other areas of life.
Conclusion
Ultimately, if this critic’s “Mere Molinist Dilemma” is a key theme threaded throughout his 300-page online document, now that this thread has been pulled, the whole thing is likely to fall apart.[5]
Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),
Dr. Tim Stratton
Notes
[1] Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006).
[2] William Lane Craig, Response to Richard Dawkins book, The God Delusion, 2013
[3] The central argument of my book is summed up in the final sentence: “This is all to say: the inference to the best explanation of all the data is Molinism.” One of the arguments I made is that one can be a 5-Point Calvinist and a Mere Molinist. I stand by that argument, however, if it were to fail, that does nothing to show that the best explanation of all the data (biblical, historical, theological, and philosophical) is some flavor of Molinism.
[4] Colton Carlson, A Brief Philosophical & Dialectical Inquiry on Mere Molinism: A Compatibilist Reply (Volume 1 & 2), 2022
[5] I have more to say about many of Carlson’s other points. These will most likely be addressed on YouTube (here is one video addressing more of his critiques). Make sure to subscribe to the FreeThinking Ministries YouTube channel. Stay tuned.
