A Response to the Grounding Objection: Adams, Zambrano, and Cowen—the Contemporary Debate on Molinism
Abstract: The grounding objection (GO) looms large as the principal objection against Molinism. Among the two main types of GOs lie the truthmaker-style GO that seeks to repudiate the Molinist claim of the truths of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCF) by virtue of the lack of metaphysical groundings of those CCFs. As will be demonstrated … Continue reading A Response to the Grounding Objection: Adams, Zambrano, and Cowen—the Contemporary Debate on Molinism
Question: Dear Tim, I just finished reading your “Dangerous Grounds” article and I could use a little clarification. Can you please further explain why it is that if God does not possess knowledge of creaturely freedom logically prior to his creative decree, then the only two options we are left with are open theism or “exhaustive … Continue reading Is God’s Knowledge Like a Box of Chocolates?
One of the most common protests against Molinism today is a purely philosophical argument known as the “Grounding Objection.” This complaint is based on a controversial version of the correspondence theory of truth known as the theory of truth-makers. Accordingly, in order for a statement to be true, then there needs to be something else in … Continue reading Dangerous Grounds: The Grounding Objection vs Divine Determinism
Obviously, atheists object to God’s existence, but surprisingly, many Christians (at least inadvertently) reject the existence of a maximally great being as well! This objection is commonly advanced by specific Christians who are committed to deterministic assumptions and oppose what has been referred to as “the single most fruitful theological concept” ever conceived — Molinism! This … Continue reading The Grounding Objection Against The Maximally Great God