In a forthcoming paper entitled Does the Purpose Theory of the Meaning of Life Entail an Irrational God, I defend the Purpose Theory (PT) of the meaning of human life. PT is the position that God’s telic creation of human beings is a necessary condition for human life to be objectively meaningful. My defense of … Continue reading Practical Rationality & Middle Knowledge
Question: Got a question for you guys after reading a recent article from Tim Stratton. It’s titled Can God Create a Morally Perfect Creature. Here goes… If God is free in the libertarian sense, and he cannot sin, why could he not create us to be free and yet unable to sin as well? I’m asking because the … Continue reading Can God Create a Morally Perfect Creature? (Part Two)
Question Dear Tim, I am in a discussion with a skeptic and it has basically come down to “why couldn’t God create a free moral creature with a morally perfect nature?” Basically if God can have free will and not do evil what limits Him from creating humans who do as well? My contention was … Continue reading Can God Create a Morally Perfect Creature?
Perhaps the most common objection to Molinism is the so called Grounding Objection. Molinism, you may recall, asserts that God’s knowledge of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) is explanatory prior to God’s creative decree. A CCF is a counterfactual that has the form: ‘If person P were in circumstances C, P would freely execute … Continue reading Grounds to Object to the Grounding Objection
Question: Dear Tim, I will try to be as concise and brief as possible. I am a Christian and my question is concerning free will, determinism, Molinism and of course, with respect to your Argument of Freethinking against Naturalism. The Freethinking Argument Against Naturalism is formulated as follows: 1- If naturalism is true, the immaterial … Continue reading Is the Freethinking Argument Question Begging?
Abstract: The outgrowth of the truthmaker theory is due in part to the realist conception of truth that has been endorsed more prominently in recent years. Supplementing this realism is the notion of truthmaking—that truth depends upon the world. As a ‘cheater-catching’ business, the truthmaking enterprise has been celebrated to exclude ontologically groundless metaphysical systems. Some … Continue reading A Molinist’s Guide Toward ‘Truthmaking’
The first genealogy within the Gospel of Matthew is an important cornerstone of the Gospel. This genealogy—a relic of the pre-Jewish-Roman War—contains, at the very heart of it, a Jewish tapestry that may only be deciphered by a thoroughly Jewish mind. In interpreting the genealogy, we find that it is indeed the pinnacle of the … Continue reading Matthew: Jesus’ Genealogy and Biblical Inerrancy
Summary: In The Dividing Line episode Behold the Secular Woman & WLC on Molinism (Once Again) James White argues that Molinism lacks the explanatory resources to sufficiently answer what determines the truth value of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (hereafter, CCFs). In this essay I highlight an ambiguity in White’s use of the word ‘determine’. I then address his objection, … Continue reading Responding to James White’s Anti-Molinist Critiques: The Truthmaker-Style Grounding Objection
“deus absconditus” (the hidden God) – Thomas Aquinas Having stumbled across the doctrine of Hell, Atheist Smith frets over the seemingly harsh punishments promised to the unbelievers within Christianity. Deep within, he wants to submit to the “fairy-tale” that billions of people believe in the world. Yet, he just can’t wrap his head around one … Continue reading Deconstructing the Generic Hiddenness Argument
Summary: In The Dividing Line episode Behold the Secular Woman & WLC on Molinism (Once Again) James White argues that if Molinists are anti-realists about abstract objects, then they cannot consistently affirm that middle knowledge demarcates the range of feasible worlds available for God to create. This is because, according to White, counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (hereafter, CCFs) must … Continue reading Responding to James White’s Anti-Molinist Critiques: Abstract Objects