Bradley Bowen has recently argued that it is highly improbable that God raised Jesus from the dead (See Why I Reject the Resurrection – Part 3: Improbability of the Resurrection). According to Bowen, the improbability of the resurrection is one of the reasons why he rejects the resurrection. Let H denote the hypothesis that God raised Jesus … Continue reading Bradley Bowen on the Improbability of the Resurrection
Question Dear Dr. Erasmus, Tim Stratton shared your post, Objections to the Existence of the Soul, to the UK Apologetics and Evangelism Facebook group, of which I am a member. In that group, there is a very knowledgeable Christian who does not seem to believe in the existence of a soul yet says he is not a … Continue reading Should Christians Reject the Soul for Biblical Reasons?
In a recent blog post, Professor Keith Parsons offers three reasons for why (he thinks) the soul does not exist. (You might recall that Parsons debated William Lane Craig in 1998). Since Parsons’ objections to substance dualism (for simplicity, I will hereafter refer to substance dualism simply as ‘dualism’) seem rather common among lay atheists, … Continue reading Objections to the Existence of the Soul
In my previous post, I discussed Jeffery Jay Lowder’s opening statement in his debate with Frank Turek on the topic “Naturalism vs. Theism”. Lowder defends the following three propositions: (1) The best explanation is the explanation with the overall greatest balance of intrinsic probability and accuracy. (2) Naturalism is an intrinsically more probable explanation than … Continue reading Assessing Lowder’s Argument for Naturalism: Part 2
Jeffery Jay Lowder recently debated Frank Turek on the topic “Naturalism vs. Theism” (see https://youtu.be/ENZYEPpR2Jc). In this post and the next, I wish to examine the arguments that Lowder advances in his opening statement in support of naturalism (the view that physical reality is the ultimate reality and that no supernatural, non-physical beings, such as … Continue reading Assessing Lowder’s Argument for Naturalism: Part 1