Summary: In The Dividing Line episode Behold the Secular Woman & WLC on Molinism (Once Again) James White argues that if Molinists are anti-realists about abstract objects, then they cannot consistently affirm that middle knowledge demarcates the range of feasible worlds available for God to create. This is because, according to White, counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (hereafter, CCFs) must … Continue reading Responding to James White’s Anti-Molinist Critiques: Abstract Objects
Summary: In The Dividing Line episode Behold the Secular Woman & WLC on Molinism (Once Again) James White argues that Molinism is false because it prohibits God from creating creaturely essences. Here, I offer several interpretations of White’s argument and demonstrate that regardless of which interpretation White prefers his argument can be shown to have an unargued premise. Video … Continue reading Responding to James White’s Anti-Molinist Critiques: Creaturely Essences
Summary: In the movie Calvinist the interviewees (ostensibly) argue in favor of the doctrine of perseverance of the saints (hereafter, PS). Since the interviewees are compatibilists, I presuppose that they intend to argue in favor of a model of PS according to which Christians persevere through the means of determinism (hereafter I shall refer to this … Continue reading Responding to the Movie “Calvinist” (Part 5): Perseverance of the Saints
Consider the following popular objection to Molinism: “Molinism stipulates that the truth-value of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are logically prior to the divine creative decree. Since their truth value is logically prior to the divine creative decree, then it follows that their truth value is not caused1 by God (i.e. it is not the result … Continue reading Do Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedom Undermine God’s Omnipotence?
To see part 2 of this response click here. Summary: In an episode of “The Dividing Line” entitled William Lane Craig, the Lowered Bar, Molinism, and Erasmus, James White argues that middle knowledge undermines God’s sovereignty. This essay argues that White’s criticisms either yield trivial conclusions, yield self-undermining premises, imply a viewpoint that is wholly … Continue reading Molinism and Creaturely Essences: A Response to James White (Part 1)
Does Libertarian Free Will Imply That We Can Stop Sinning Altogether?: A Response to Monergism Books
Monergism Books (hereafter, MB) posted the following on Facebook: Source: https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=10150964832184949&id=15086969948 Just in case MB’s Facebook post gets compromised I will reproduce their statement here: “You think you have a free will? Then demonstrate it: in your own power, stop sinning altogether. The fact that no person can choose to live a sinless life is … Continue reading Does Libertarian Free Will Imply That We Can Stop Sinning Altogether?: A Response to Monergism Books
Summary: In the movie Calvinist the interviewees (ostensibly) argue in favor of the doctrine of total depravity and that it precludes libertarian free will (hereafter LFW). In this essay I demonstrate that the interviewees beg the question in favor of total depravity and for the idea that it is at odds with LFW. Introduction The … Continue reading Responding to the Movie “Calvinist” (Part 1): Total Depravity
Summary: In Matt Slick’s “Why Write About Molinism?” he raises two major complaints. The first is that Molinism is eisegetical. I understand Slick’s second complaint to be that the Molinist hermeneutic undermines sola scriptura. Here I argue that Molinists who are consistently committed to the idea that Molinism is underdetermined by Scripture cannot possibly be … Continue reading Does Molinism Undermine Sola Scriptura?: A Response to CARM.org’s “Why Write About Molinism?”
Summary: Paul Helm has contributed an article to Ligonier.org in which he presents two noteworthy objections to Molinism. First, Helm presents an internal critique of Molinism purporting to show that Libertarian Free Will (LFW) undermines God’s providential control over the world. Second, Helm argues that Molinism is incompatible with the doctrine of irresistible grace. I … Continue reading Paul Helm Misses The Mark on Molinism: A Response to Ligonier.org’s “Molinism 101”
Summary: In my essay “How Should a Molinist Understand 1 Peter 1:3?” I defended the idea that 1 Peter 1:3 underdetermines whether libertarian free will (LFW) or divine causal determinism (DCD) obtains. One way one could attempt to adjudicate between these competing theories is to appeal to Ockham’s razor. Specifically, one could argue that a … Continue reading Does Ockham’s Razor Preclude a Libertarian Interpretation of 1 Peter 1:3?
“Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ! According to his great mercy, he has caused us to be born again to a living hope through the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. . .” 1 Pet. 1:3 (ESV) For the determinist, this verse would seem to pose a problem for … Continue reading How Should a Molinist Understand 1 Peter 1:3?
An Unfortunate Appraisal of Molinism: A Response to CARM.org’s “What Is Molinism and is it Biblical?”
Summary: CARM, a Reformed ministry, has given a negative appraisal of Molinism. I lay out 9 issues with their explanation and critique of the doctrine, undercutting/rebutting their claims by showing that they either rely on comprehensional errors, dictional ambiguity, or question begging (or some medley of these).1 Source: http://carm.org/what-molinism Issue 1: CARM Misrepresents Libertarian Free … Continue reading An Unfortunate Appraisal of Molinism: A Response to CARM.org’s “What Is Molinism and is it Biblical?”
Some of the great features of philosophy include its emphasis on clarity of concepts, careful delineation of premises, and logical rigor. Unfortunately, these qualities which serve to secure the high quality of discussion on the academic level are often lost on the popular level. The untoward result of this loss is that the quality of … Continue reading Some Reasons to Keep Assertions And Their Implications/Entailments Distinct
Defining Special Pleading Special pleading (also known as a double standard) is an informal fallacy that occurs when an exception is created to a principle, law, rule, generalization, or something roughly similar to these when we would expect that principle (or whatever it may be) to apply to whatever is being excluded and no rational … Continue reading What is Special Pleading?
Understanding the differences between internal and external critiques is critical for Christian apologists since any and every objection they will face will fall into one of these two categories. Moreover, if one has not sufficiently grasped these concepts, then one will be prone to conflating them or else might have trouble identifying when others commit … Continue reading The Difference Between Internal & External Critiques
Experientially speaking, one of the most common reasons popular-level atheists give for their rejection of the Kalam Cosmological Argument (from hereon, KCA) is their belief that the argument relies on its defender committing the fallacy of special pleading. Special pleading occurs when an exception is given to a principle (or something roughly equivalent such as … Continue reading Special Pleading With the Kalam Cosmological Argument?